But greater forces are fighting for us than our armies. This War will be settled largely by the imponderables—by the forces of public opinion all over the world which have been mobilised by German outrages, by fear on the part of the governing classes of Central Europe of the dark forces of revolution already gathering in the back-ground, by the gaunt spectre of want or even starvation already stalking through the consequential *Value of* and *blockade* factors of morals to which even Napoleon attached more military importance than to the prowess of his armies.

Thus the present impotence of the Russian Army is almost balanced and in the end may be more than balanced by the dread which this example of successful revolution is inspiring in the rulers of Central Europe. And the coming in of even pacific America shows the growing force of the imponderables set free by this War in the minds of the nation.

In this connection two considerations cannot be too clearly realised by us. First, that in our diplomacy and our conduct of the War we should ever strive to keep this world opinion on our side and not be deflected by German methods of barbarism or in any other way from our true course. This affect such questions as the severer forms of reprisals, our coercion of small neutral

nations.
and even an added emphasis to our traditional
generous policy in purely domestic affairs. and
similar questions. Second, that the imponderables
will continue to act beyond the duration of this
War and produce greater changes than any which
we will be able to achieve or even contemplate in